Every form factor and OS class issued to students today. 1:1 Chromebook deployment with class-shared iPads in lower grades is the typical TX K-12 pattern; iPad-primary or Windows-laptop programs exist in specific contexts. Distinct from the management platforms that govern them — those live in EUC-MGT F1. Empty selection here is incomplete data, not a finding.
How devices are distributed across the student population. The maturity question is whether the model is documented and consistent — the top three options below are all defensible postures (uniform 1:1, grade-tiered 1:1 + class-shared, or pure class-shared), and small districts can defensibly run any of them. Ad-hoc distribution is a hard finding: without a model, the district can't size loss/damage budgets, plan refresh, or know what's actually deployed.
Whether device type, take-home rules, app set, and AUP variant vary by grade band — and whether that variation is documented as policy. No hard finding: a single uniform posture is defensible at small scale, and the maturity question is documentation rather than the existence of differentiation itself.
How the district operationalizes its AUP at device issuance. Most TX K-12 districts hold the AUP at the school-board policy layer (e.g., TASB CQ); this field captures whether that policy is operationalized into per-student signed agreements with reliable storage. Issuing devices without a parent agreement is a hard finding — liability for damage costs, internet usage, and off-campus incidents has no documented basis.
Whether devices leave campus, under what permissions, and how they return at year-end. No hard finding: the real take-home risk surface (encryption, app control, identity-based access) is captured in EUC-MGT and the F6 field below. This question is the policy/discipline layer — whether take-home is a documented and tracked process or an informal practice.
How student devices are restricted from installing arbitrary apps and extensions. Cross-ref EUC-MGT F6 / F7: the management platform's baseline coverage and enforcement mode are the mechanism — a gap here that doesn't surface in MGT F6/F7 (or vice versa) is a documentation inconsistency. Unrestricted install on a 1:1 fleet is a hard finding — malicious or productivity-disrupting extensions install at scale and bypass any other controls the platform enforces.
Not CIPA content filtering. CIPA-required content filtering and on-device / take-home filtering live entirely in the Network Infrastructure Content Filter sub-domain (NET-CF). This field captures only the classroom-management / instructional-visibility layer — the teacher-facing “see what's on student screens” tooling, distinct from district-level content blocking. Some districts deliberately don't deploy this category for privacy or instructional-philosophy reasons; defensible position, no hard finding.
How loss and damage are handled — both the policy itself and where families learn about it. No hard finding: “documented tiers” and “district absorbs” are both defensible postures (some districts deliberately absorb costs for equity reasons). The maturity question is whether the posture is documented and consistently applied.
How broken devices get back into student hands. In-house tier-1 + vendor swap escalation is the modern TX K-12 pattern for 1:1 Chromebook fleets — screens, keyboards, batteries handled on-site; logic-board failures swap through the vendor. Ad-hoc repair is a hard finding: in a 1:1 fleet at scale, no documented workflow means students lose instructional access for indeterminate periods.
How students get help when something isn't working. The mature TX K-12 pattern is a documented escalation path — classroom teacher first (battery, charging, login), campus tech second (hardware, software issues), district IT third (account, network, escalations). No formal student-side support is a hard finding: a 1:1 fleet at scale generates support volume that cannot run on individual relationships.